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1. Abstract 
 
This paper investigates employment sector choice for Palestinian men and women, 
the paper analyzes wage differential by gender and sector. The paper utilizes 
Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Labor Force Surveys for the years 
1999, 2001, 2007, and 2010. Although returns to education by gender has been 
analyzed before, this paper is the first to analyze wage differential and sector choice 
by gender. The results indicate that there are stark differences by gender from the 
view point of sector choice, returns to education, and decomposition of sector and 
gender wage differentials. Low returns to education tend to diminish the importance 
of the endowment effect in explaining the sector and gender wage gaps.  The Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition of the gender wage differential shows higher predicted log 
hourly wages for females than for males for all years in the public sector, for the 
private and “other” sectors, the results are mixed. The sector wage gap reflects a 
higher predicted log hourly wage in favor of public and “other” compared to private; 
this result is not surprising given that more lower educational levels are found to be in 
the private sector than the remaining sectors. 
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2. Introduction 
 
Gender wage differentials across economic sectors have attracted considerable attention 
in the literature of labor economics. The wage differentials between different sectors can 
be caused by the unobserved characteristics of the workers or the existence of some 
discrimination against women depending on the sector.   
 
In many countries, public sector employment has a significant share of both total 
employment and public sector expenditures, and plays essential role in economic 
performance. In general, the public sector has different characteristics and working 
conditions that it is used to produce goods and services generally with no substitutes in 
the private sector. As a result, the public sector acts as a monopsony in the labor market, 
where some researchers use this fact to explain the gender wage differentials. All of these 
features may affect the performance and functioning of the labor market.  
 
In Palestine, salaries and wages have comprised a major component of the public budget. 
In December 2006, the Palestinian Ministry of Finance reported that salaries and wages 
constituted 68.3%of the Palestinian Authority budget for that year. Moreover, the wage 
bill accounts for 287%of domestic revenues in 2002 and grew to be 395% in 2007, which 
is unsustainable. The government began encouraging an early retirement policy (at full 
salary) and replacing some of the old security guard with younger ones. The gender 
aspect of public employment is nearly limited to civilian posts as females are not equally 
represented in the security apparatus. 
 
In the Palestinian labor market, the choice issue is complicated by political as well as 
supply and demand factors. While female labor supply is limited (low labor force 
participation and limited to certain sectors), the economy’s absorptive capacity is also 
limited due to restricted access to Israeli labor markets and Israeli restrictions on the 
exportation of Palestinian goods. Due to these dire economic conditions, two opposing 
pressures on the public sector were taking place; in the post second Intifada days (2003 – 
2007), public employment was rising at a fast pace putting so much pressure on the fiscal 
budget. Mounting criticism on the public finance front(such as UNRWA (2006) and 
UNCTAD (2008)) resulted in the government’s policy of restraining public employment 
in its Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) of2008-2010. The financial 
reform which resulted in the application of the civil service law of 1998 and the 
subsequent adjustments to the pay scale (2005 for example), also resulted in altering 
public/private wage ratio.  
 
In 2006, more than 100,000 public employees did not receive their monthly salaries for a 
period of more than a year; recommendations were advanced to limit wages at the public 
sector. This was defended on the basis of a preliminary observation that workers in the 
public sector on average earn a significant premium of around 15% over their private 
sector counterparts. In the local Palestinian context, the public sector has to compete not 
only with the private sector but also with an active non-governmental sector to attract and 
retain good human resources. Here, the level of wages and their differential among males 
and females across these three sectors reveal to play critical role in the labor force 
distribution. 
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The outline of the paper begins with an introduction and review, followed by data and 
descriptive analysis. Section five provides the model and empirical analysis, followed by 
the conclusions. 
 
3. Data and Sample Descriptives 
 
In light of the political situation in Palestine, sector choice take a special meaning; that is 
because employment is Israel pays well but is captive to political stability. The private 
sector is also strongly influenced by the political situation, periods of political unrest 
witnesses closures and restricted trade; particularly on Palestinian goods destined to 
Israel. This makes public sector employment the most attractive (except for donor 
disbursement of aid). Figure 1 below shows the trends. 
 
Figure 1: Wage employment distribution by sector 
 
Sources: Authors calculations 
 
Obviously, the private sector’s absorptive capacity has been diminishing with a slight 
improvement in 2010. The public sector on the other hand is steadily rising. Although the 
shares above account for wage employment only, if we consider unpaid family members 
and self employment, the private sectors’ share will be larger. The non-wage employment 
is not included in the analysis because the paper focuses on wage employment in addition 
to sector choice. 
 
The contributions of the various sectors to GDP are introduced to shed light on economic 
activity by sector. The data on the “other” sector cannot be readily obtained from national 
value added, however, it must be noted that its size is small in terms of contributions to 
GDP and employment. The figure below shows value added by the private and public 
sectors. 
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Figure 1: Percentage Contribution to GDP by Economic Activity for the Years 1994-2009 at Current 
Prices- 1994 to 20094 
 
Source: Palestinian Bureau Center of Statistics (PCBS) 
 
It can be seen that the contribution of the private sector has diminished over the sample 
span from 80% in 1994 to about 60% in 2009. The two categories education and health 
contain both private and public contributions, although education is mostly public. The 
public sector contribution has risen in 2003 to reach almost 20% and declined thereafter 
due to mounting criticism of over-employment. The retreat of the private sector can be 
attributed to many factors, the most important of which is movement and access 
restrictions (Particularly on Gaza since 2007), competition with Israeli products which 
have freer movement, and Israeli practices which make it more costly to import and 
export. In addition to that, the bulk of Palestinian firms are small size which limits the 
benefits of scale economies, research and development, and a legal environment that does 
not support property and intellectual rights (El-Jaafari, Hantash, and Ali (2008).  
 
The study utilizes Palestine Labor Force Surveys (PLFS) which is collected by the 
Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) on quarterly bases. The quarterly data was 
merged to form annual data sets. Each quarter, PCBS collects data on about 7500 
households; each household is interviewed twice consecutively, left for two quarters, then 
interviewed again for two quarters. This would allow one to perform short panel analysis. 
The data is weighted by 2007 population census. We used the year 1999 as a starting 
point where the economy was stable and unemployment was relatively low. 2001 and 
2007 were Intifada and government shutdown years, representing poor labor market 
performance. The year 2010 is supposed to be an improvement where GDP roughly 
                                                 
4Private sector include: Agriculture & Fishing, Mining, Manufacturing, Electricity and Water, Construction, 
Wholesale & Retail Trade, Transport, Storage and Communications, Financial intermediation, Services ( Real Estate, 
Renting and Business Services, Community, Social and Personal Services, and Hotel and Restaurants), Households 
with Employed persons. Public Sector include: Public Administration and Defense and Public owned Employed 
persons. 
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reached 1999 levels, but it remains to be said that starting 2007, the PNA started a 
Medium Term Fiscal Framework that aimed at controlling public employment and 
government public expenditures. The data contains information about the family 
demographic and social characteristics (age, gender, marital status, educational levels and 
others indicators) and about employment (employment status, economic activities, place 
of work and other labor force indicators).  
 
The sample is restricted to include those who were wage employees aged from 15 to 65 
for the selected years in the public, private and ‘other’ sectors5 of the Palestinian territory. 
The analysis in this paper, exclude employers, self-employed individuals and unpaid 
family members because the paper focuses on sector selection to correct for returns to 
education.  The Labor force survey has a question about the number of work hours per 
week but not the number weeks worked per month or per year.  
 
The Palestinian labor market was subjected to various shocks since 1967 war; the first 
intifada (1987), the second intifada (2000), and the operation cast lead (Gaza war) at the 
end of 2008 after the Hamas won in the legislative council elections in (2006). These 
events have significant demand shocks; as a result the unemployment rate6 in Palestinian 
territory increased from 11.8% in 1999 to reach 25.3% in 2001.After the second Intifada, 
in 2007 it has decreased to 21.7% but still higher than 1999 (normal year). Moreover, in 
2007 the number of Palestinian workers in Israel and settlements from the Gaza Strip 
reached zero; which increased the labor supply to the domestic market, putting downward 
pressure on unskilled male workers’ wages and another pressure on Palestinian Authority 
to absorb a large number of these employees. For males, the unemployment rate 
increased from 11.8% in 1999 to 23.1% in 2010, while female’s unemployment rate has 
increased from 13% to 26.8%. Figure 1 below shows the unemployment rate by years of 
schooling. For men, higher education implies lower unemployment, but for women, the 
highest unemployment rate is for college graduates. The figure also shows how the 2001 
intifada affected mostly unskilled male workers. 
 
Figure3: Unemployment rate by gender and level of education 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Other sector include the employees in the following: foreign government, UNRWA, International 
organizations and NGOs 
6 Source: different Labor Force Surveys, PCBS   
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In the occupied Palestinian Territory (oPT) wage employments’ share of total 
employment has fluctuated between roughly 60% in 2007 to almost 69% in 2010 and 
always higher in Gaza and seems to decline during periods of instability (2001 and 2007). 
Figure 4 below shows wage employments’ share by region. 
 
Figure 4: Wage employments’ share of total employment by region, 1999-2010 
 
Source: Authors calculation 
 
In order to motivate the discussion on sector choice, we find (Table A1) that weekly work 
hours have dropped roughly by half in the public sector while hourly wage rose 
substantially compared to the two other sectors. Meanwhile, The private sector did not 
witness big improvements in either reduction on weekly work hours or hourly wage. 
Internally, construction has the highest hourly wage for all four years and witnessed the 
lowest decline in weekly work hours. Overtime, constructions, share of private sectors’ 
wage employment has been the highest and ranged between 29% (2007) and 41% (1999).  
Agriculture has also witnessed substantial decline in work hours but very marginal 
improvements in hourly wage. Transport and storage has had the biggest improvement in 
hourly wages, albeit, not much improvement wage employment share. Finally, It must be 
noticed that variations do exist within each sector based on data shown in (Table A1).  
 
The breakdown of wage employment share by gender and sector is shown in Table 1, 
across the years, the percentage of male wage employees is higher in private sector 
compared with public sector ranging from between 74% and 62%. While the female 
wage employees have nearly the same percentage between the public and private sectors 
through years; In general females’ share of wage employment in the private sector is 
lower than males’; however, it is higher in the public and other sectors. This points out 
that the bulk of female employment is in the service sector.       
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Table 1: Percetage of wage Employees in Palestian territory by Sector and Gender 
Sex/Sector public private other 
  2010 
Male 21 74 4 
Female 37 46 17 
  2007 
Male 31 62 7 
Female 36 43 21 
  2001 
Male 28 67 5 
Female 40 44 16 
  1999 
Male 21 74 4 
Female 37 46 17 
Source: Authors calculations 
 
The average daily wage for males rose 23% between 1999 and  2010, for females the 
growth 40%. Moreover, the average daily wages for males is higher than females in all 
years.  
 
Figure 5: The average daily wages (NIS) by gender in Palestinian territory 
 
Source: Authors calculations 
 
The average daily wage gap is highest in 1999 being 40% in favor of males, although it 
dropped to 30% in 2001 and stayed thereafter at 20%. These changes can be explained by 
changes in labor supply of educated female workers. Although Figure 4 below shows the 
participation of all male or female workers against hourly wage, it depicts a more stable 
and positive relation for females than for males. The drastic drop in male participation in 
2001 was a result of the closure of the Israeli labor markets. 
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Figure 6: Scatter plot of hourly wage and participation rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors calculations 
 
Figure 7 below shows that average log hourly wage is always lower for females in the 
private sector, although the gap seems to be narrowing over time. It is also true that 
female wages are higher in the public sector, but male wages are higher in the “other” 
sector. Average log hourly wages are higher for the “other” sector when compared to 
private and public for both men and women. The figure also shows that female public 
sector wages are much higher than the private sector, but for men they are roughly equal 
in 1999 and 2001 and higher for the latter years. 
 
Figure 7: Log hourly wage for Palestinian women and men by sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors Calculations 
 
Potential experience (Mincer, 1974) is computed as age minus years of schooling minus 
six (age of enroll in school). It is shown in tables A2-A5 that males have more experience 
than female across sectors and throughout the sample span. The male/female gap is 
highest in the “other” sector in 2010 where males potential experience exceeds females 
by 6 years. 
 
The distribution of wage employment by educational attainment is also provided in 
Tables A2-A5, for men (tables A2 and A3), there is an obvious and clear trend. When 
Male Female
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employed in the public or “other” sector, the distribution is nearly evenly spread between 
educational levels 2, 3, and 4; but when employed in the private sector, more than two 
thirds are in educational level 2 (less than secondary). This implies that male wages 
should be lower on average in the private sector if wages are determined efficiently since 
many more of them have lower education when compared to the two other sectors. This 
has been the case for the entire sample span.  
 
Table 2: The distribution of wage employment by sector and gender 
 
  
Educ. 
Level 
Public Private Other Public Private Other 
Male Female 
19
99
 
1 1.1% 2.3% 1.7% 0.3% 3.0% 1.0%
2 34.2% 72.5% 35.3% 5.1% 44.1% 16.3%
3 35.4% 20.0% 30.5% 52.2% 36.5% 55.4%
4 26.3% 4.7% 29.0% 40.8% 15.5% 25.8%
5 3.1% 0.5% 3.5% 1.6% 0.9% 1.5%
20
01
 
1 1.0% 1.6% 1.5% 0.1% 3.1% 0.4%
2 32.8% 72.8% 35.4% 6.2% 41.9% 6.7%
3 35.5% 19.3% 27.3% 42.8% 34.7% 54.4%
4 27.5% 5.4% 28.3% 49.9% 19.1% 36.7%
5 3.2% 0.9% 7.5% 1.0% 1.1% 1.7%
20
07
 
1 0.2% 0.8% 0.7% 0.2% 1.6%   
2 35.1% 71.8% 33.9% 8.6% 39.0% 15.8%
3 34.9% 19.9% 28.4% 30.2% 28.9% 29.5%
4 26.3% 6.5% 30.7% 58.1% 27.4% 52.4%
5 3.4% 1.1% 6.4% 2.9% 3.1% 2.3%
20
10
 
1 0.3% 0.7% 0.8% 0.1% 1.3% 0.5%
2 35.0% 69.9% 39.1% 5.8% 30.0% 11.9%
3 28.0% 19.6% 20.3% 25.9% 30.0% 26.3%
4 32.4% 8.1% 34.6% 64.3% 35.2% 57.1%
5 4.4% 1.7% 5.3% 4.0% 3.5% 4.3%
Source: Authors calculations 
 
As for females, the trends are not as obvious. It is obvious, however, that unlike men, 
women are more concentrated in education level 4 (BA and higher diploma) by more 
than 50% in the public sector. The same applies to the “other” sector, for 1999 and 2001, 
the concentration was in education level 3 (secondary and lower diploma); later more that 
50% where in education level 4. For the private sector, education levels 2 and 3 seem to 
dominate without strong concentration. That implies it will be harder to disentangle 
female wage inequality in the private sector based on education.  
 
Figure 8 below shows average years of schooling by sector of employment, this Figure 
confirms the findings of educational attainment distribution. The male average years of 
schooling is roughly equal for public and private sectors with an increasing trend. In the 
“other” sectors, average years of schooling is higher than both. In comparison, female 
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average years of schooling is higher than males’ in the public and lower in private and 
“other”.  Based on that, one would expect that female wages to be higher on average than 
males in public and similar to lower in private and “other” sectors. 
 
 
Figure 8: Average years of schooling by gender and sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors Calculations 
 
In general, males and females who are never married have strong presence in private 
sector across years compared with public and other sectors. This implies that married, 
widowed and divorced tend to seek employment in the sectors which provide more job 
security. At the regional level, there are significant differences in sector employment 
between males and females. In each sector for all years, female employment is largely 
concentrated in the West Bank; usually two thirds or more. As for men, the public sector 
employment is a bit higher than 50%in Gaza, which seems strange given that Gaza has 
roughly one third the population. This implies that the public sector is over-staffed in the 
Gaza Strip. On the other hand, more people are employed in the private sector in the 
West Bank (70%) and “other” (slightly over 60%). Overtime and since the political split 
between the West Bank and Gaza, The private sectors’ share increased in the West Bank 
to over 50%, while the “other” sectors’ share rose in Gaza relative to the West Bank. This 
is a reflection on international organizations’ increased relief efforts to reduce the 
economic impact of the Israeli siege on Gaza. 
 
 
4. The Literature 
 
Sectorial wage differentials have been of considerable interest for economists recently; 
they are motivated primarily by wage setting behavior in the private and public sectors 
and because of the fiscal and monetary implications of the public sector wage bill. Tansel 
(2004) provides an overview of the literature on wage setting in the private and public 
sectors. While private sector firms are driven by the profit motive, public sector 
institutions / decision makers are driven by political factors; the voter maximization 
Male Female 
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model, Reder (1975) and Borjas (1980) and the budget maximization model (Niskanen 
(1975)) are used to explain employment and wage setting in the public sector. 
Alternatively, the trade unions model of Gunderson (1979) and Holmlund (1993) show 
how trade unions use collective bargaining to explain wage and employment setting.  
 
There are particular groups who shift the focus of sectorial wage differential to study the 
gender aspect; Assaad (1997), Tansel (2004), Blau and Kahn (2007), Lewis and 
Galloway (2011), and Danh (2006). Others differentiate between state and federal 
government such as Richwine (2011) and Blank (1985). Blau and Khan (2007) indicate 
that female and male wages have experienced considerable convergence in the US since 
1978, but that a sizable portion of the gap is still unaccounted for and is unlikely to 
vanish in the near future. In these studies, the gender wage gap can be caused by the 
human capital model, sectorial choice and/or occupation, and discrimination.  
 
In the Palestinian case, there were two studies, which examined the sector wage 
differential, neither of which addressed this issue in its entirety. Mataria, A.,et al (2007) 
has analyzed this issue using ordinal logistic regression without considering gender and 
selection issues. Miaari (2009) uses quantile regression analysis to decompose the sector 
wage gap for males in explained (human capital model) and unexplained (skill) for the 
period 1998 to 2006. A new development beyond 2006 requires a re-examination of the 
sector wage differential with gender analysis. Miaari (2009) uses Reimers (1983), 
Newman and Oaxaca (2004) for the selectivity decomposition. Daoud (2005) looked at 
the schooling premium differential between private and public sector employment and 
found that for 1999 and 2001; public sector employment premium is negative compared 
to all other wage employments for both men and women, though less negative for 
women. Tansel and Daoud (2011) also found that, for 2004 and 2008, female returns to 
an additional year of schooling are higher in the public sector (8.9% and 8.1% 
respectively); in the formal private sector, females earn an additional 7.7% for both years. 
For males, the return in the public sector is similar (but lower) to females; however, in the 
formal private sector, it nearly drops to half of that in the private sector. These papers did 
not correct for sector selection either. 
 
Finally, Vella (1998) provides an overview of the literature on the available methods for 
estimating models with sample selection including parametric and semi parametric 
models. He also proposes methods to tackle sample selection with panel data. This paper 
will follow the parameterized Heckman type model. 
 
5. Methodology and Analysis:  
5.1 Wage Equations 
 
The econometric literature summarizes the main determinants of gender wage gap in two 
points. First, labor market discrimination defined as “different payment for men and 
women with the same productivity” (Ehrenberg, et al, 1991)7. Second, the differences in 
the endowments of female and male workers, which include education, experience and 
                                                 
7 Public sector productivity is measured at factor cost 
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training, as well as some job characteristics, such as location of firms and its size, are also 
included. 
 
The common method of measuring the gender wage gap is to estimate the semi-log 
wages equations for both male and female. The wage equations are standard human 
capital (Mincer (1974), Becker (1975)) forms; where the log of the wage of individual i 
in sector j depends on schooling and a group of social and personal characteristics (Xj).  
Ln Wij = B0 + BjXj + Uj     (1) 
 
Where B0is the intercept term, Bj is a vector of slope coefficients, and ௝ܷ~݅݅݀ܰሺ0, ߪଶሻ. 
Estimation of such models by standard techniques (OLS) suffers from potential biases; it 
requires that sector selection be taken into consideration. Heckman (1976) points that 
sample selection biases may result if selection is not addressed.  
 
The correction for sector selection is attained by using the multinomial logit modeli. 
Palestinian workers can choose between the public sector (j=1), the domestic private 
sector (j=2), the “otherii” category (j=3), and not working (j=4). The base category (j=4) 
is the base outcome group includes both unemployed and non-participants (Tansel 2004). 
The probability of selecting sector j is  
∑+=
j
z
z
j j
j
e
eP
α
α
1
      (2) 
Equation (2) is estimated by the multinomial logit method as outlined in Bourguignon, F., 
Fournier, M., Gurgand, M., (2007), the results of equation (2) are then used to construct a 
self-selection term (estimated from the densities and cumulative distribution functions of 
the standard normal) which is included in the wage equation to correct for sector 
selection. 
 
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated jointly using the selmlog Stata module; the empirical 
specification of equation 1 includes experience and quadratic experience to capture the 
earnings profile of workers. The set of educational dummies are grouped into four groups 
in order to maintain a good number of observations for each category, in particular when 
dealing with female regressions; the categories are: illiterate is the base group, less than 
secondary (roughly 11 years of schooling for a maximum) is level 1, secondary and lower 
diploma is level 2, Bachelorette and upper diploma is level 3, and level 4 has the MA and 
PhD holders. This allows one to capture nonlinearities in returns to education as well as 
the differential returns for the various levels of education. A regional dummy for the 
West Bank was also includediii, and a social dummy for never married. For women, 
having children may result into lower participation, thus it is expected that the never 
married dummy will have a positive effect on participation, however, an ambiguous 
effect on wages. The selection equation should include variables(z vector in equation 2) 
that affect the sector and participation decisions; Scultz (1990) and Tansel (2004) include 
unearned income variables such as land holdings. This is not possible with the Palestinian 
Labor Force Survey (PLFS) data, instead, aggregate household wage income was 
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included in addition to household size and refugee status dummyiv. These variables are 
included to achieve identification8.  
 
5.2 Private-Public Wage Differentials by Gender 
The decomposition of log mean wages is done to show how much of the total gap is 
explained by attributes which affect productivity such as education and experience (the 
explained part), and a residual part which is unexplained by differences in wage 
determinants (Blinder 1973) and Oaxaca (1973). The latter part is often referred to as the 
discrimination part and potentially carrying the effect of changes in unobserved variables. 
Ben Jann (2008)v provides an overview of the literature on the decomposition with 
extensions to the original work of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Let the log wage 
differential be defined as follows (Jann, 2008): 
 
ܮ݊	ܹതതതതതതത௝ −	ܮ݊	ܹതതതതതതത௣ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ = ൫ ఫܺഥ −	 തܺ௣൯ᇱߚ௣ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ+	ܺᇱതതത௣൫ߚ௝ − ߚ௣൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ+ ൫ ఫܺഥ −	 തܺ௣൯ᇱ൫ߚ௝ − ߚ௣൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ 
																										ܴ																																ܧ																												ܥ																																			ܫ					 (3) 
 
Where j is the sector to be compared to the private sector which is once the public and 
another the “other” sector. The coefficient vector ߚ is indexed to match the matrix of 
explanatory variablesvi. The decomposition is also carried out with correction for 
selection which would alter the log mean wage for the group with selection bias leading 
to an over or underestimate of the differential.  
 
Equation (3) is specified from the private sector’s view point where R measures the total 
differential between sector J and the private sector. This means that the component E 
(Endowments effect) measures the expected change in private sectors’ mean log hourly 
wage if they had public sectors predictor levelsvii. If this term is negative, then the mean 
private sectors’ log hourly wages would fall if they had public sectors’ attributes. The 
sum of the terms C (coefficient) and I (interaction) are the residual components; C 
measures the expected change in private sectors’ mean log hourly wage if they had public 
sectors coefficients. The interaction term (I) represents simultaneous changes in predictor 
mean differences and coefficients. 
 
5.3 Estimation Results 
 
5.3.1 Participation and Sector Selection: The multinomial logit estimates for men and 
women are provided in Tables A6 and A7 which present the marginal effects evaluated at 
sample means. The null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are jointly zero is rejected at 
less than 1%level for men and women, The pseudo R2 is between 30% and 33%which is 
acceptable in models of cross section data. The marginal effects of experience for males 
are all positive and significant; this means that higher experience increases the probability 
of selecting any of the sectors compared to not working. Although potential experience 
                                                 
8 We have included various instruments to make the regression peculiar to the Palestinian case, such as 
having someone from the same household work in the same sector, industry dummies, employment in 
Israel, household head dummy, type of locality dummy, and reside and work in the same place dummy. 
Based on standard errors of pre-existing variables and sign correctness, we only report the results in 7-11. 
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raises the probability of sector selection, it does so at a decreasing rate. The effect of 
education on sector selection is varied depending on the sector. Although for the public 
sector higher education implies a significantly higher probability of selecting the public 
sector as the education level increase, the opposite is true for the private sector. Table A7 
shows that the marginal effects of education dummies are almost always negative except 
for 2007, a year in which the government was shut down and people looked for jobs in 
the private sector (or unpaid family business). As for the “other” sector, the marginal 
effects are positive, nonetheless, they are weak, however, significant across the different 
years of study. According to geographic location, West Bankers are less likely to be in 
the public or “other sectors” but more likely to be in the private sector than Gazan’s. This 
result is uniformly significant across the 4 years covered by the study. Never married 
Palestinian men are less likely to join any sector except for the private sector in 2007; this 
anomaly is likely to be due to the dire economic conditions which pushed younger 
generations to seek employment in the private sector especially when Israel closed its 
labor markets more tightly in 2007. 
 
The selection terms begin with household wage income, individuals from households 
with higher wage income are less likely to join the public sector. As the household wage 
income increases, individuals tend to seek employment more in the private sector or in 
the other sector. However, including the household size in the analysis implies as the 
household size increases, this would potentially increase the wage income. Thus 
controlling for the wage income, individuals from bigger households, with similar wage 
income as other households, are more geared to be selected into the “other” sector. This 
in fact may be the case with many camp dwellers, since most of them work for UNRWA 
or other UN agencies. The refugee dummy is included to check whether they are more or 
less likely to be in the public or “other” sectors; the results indicate that refugees are less 
likely to join the public sector as well as the “other” sectors; this is counter intuitive, they 
are 3-5perceent more likely to be in the private sectors than none refugees. 
 
Just like men, Palestinian women’s likelihood of selecting any sector (compared to not 
working) is increased with experience at a decreasing rate. However, unlike men, 
education improves the probability of joining all sectors for all levels of education almost 
all years of the study. The social status is also a gender disparity; never married females 
are more likely to join or select any of the three sectors than the base group (married or 
ever married). Palestinian female refugees are less likely to join any sector compared to 
none refugee women. The household wage income, although significant, seems to affect 
participation in any sector very weakly. 
 
5.3.2 Returns to Education:  
 
Table 3 below shows OLS estimates of returns to education by gender and sector of 
employment. It is evident that gender differences do exist by sector; within each sector, 
returns to education are positive, increasing and significant whether for male or female. 
This reflects nonelinearity in the return estimate. The gender differences are in favor of 
females; more often than not, it is found that the difference from the basic group 
(illiterate) is lager for women than for men. For example, female MA and PhD holders 
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will have a higher average wage by 135% more than the control group (illiterates) in the 
public sector in 1999, but 213% if employed in the “other” sector. The comparable 
figures for males are 114% and 105% respectively. Over time, differences from the basic 
group tend to be highest in the “other” sector for 1999 and 2001 for females, but switches 
to the public and private sectors in 2007 and 2010. So the trend for females is an 
improvement if educated women move into the public or private sectors. For men, 
educated men are better off (higher difference from the basic group) when they are 
employed in the public sector in good times (1999 and 2010), but worse off in the public 
sector in bad times (2001 and 2007). 
 
Table 3: OLS€ estimates of returns to educational attainment 
  
  
Education 
level¥ 
Female Male 
Public Private Other Public Private Other 
19
99
 
Level 1 0.43 -0.02 0.51 0.18 0.08 0.15 
Level 2 0.87 0.31 1.16 0.44 0.14 0.32 
Level 3 1.06 0.82 1.62 0.76 0.22 0.60 
Level 4 1.35 0.98 2.13 1.14 0.62 1.05 
20
01
 
Level 1 0.40 0.24 0.31 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Level 2 0.78 0.51 1.09 0.32 0.09 0.42 
Level 3 0.97 0.95 1.43 0.62 0.30 0.71 
Level 4 1.17 1.49 1.54 0.91 0.86 1.08 
20
07
 
Level 1 0.23 0.12 (omitted) 0.05 0.25 0.66 
Level 2 0.68 0.35 0.40 0.30 0.31 0.92 
Level 3 0.86 0.91 0.77 0.63 0.56 1.38 
Level 4 1.16 1.57 1.35 0.97 1.01 1.61 
20
10
 
Level 1 0.10 -0.02 -0.45 0.20 0.12 -0.14 
Level 2 0.62 0.29 0.17 0.46 0.23 0.16 
Level 3 0.84 0.67 0.54 0.84 0.45 0.40 
Level 4 1.22 1.43 1.03 1.16 1.12 0.68 
¥ see notes to Table A2 
€ we do not report the whole set of  coefficients for brevity
 
Tables A8 and A9 present the results for the selectivity corrected wage equations. The 
potential experience factor has the expected sign on the most part, so does the quadratic 
term. Both terms are significant for the public and private sectors, but for the other sector, 
they are only significant in 2001 but have the wrong signs. For women, experience has 
positive impact, however insignificant; the same applies to experience square, in addition 
to being insignificant possibly due to a smaller number of observations. Tansel and 
Daoud (2011) show that the wages peak at 40 years of experience for Palestine, but 
around 38 for Turkey. The male regressions have a better fit and more robust results. For 
example, returns to education increase with education in all sectors. Little variation is 
observed over time for the male wage earners. The return is also similar in magnitude for 
the public and private sectors. For the other sector, the results vary from year to year; 
generally, the return is lower for successive levels of education than would be the case in 
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the public or private sectors. Compared to men, the return to education for women is 
lower in each sector and often insignificant. There are cases (scattered across the years) 
which are reported for the private sector where the return is negative and significant. In 
general, never married individuals, whether male or female, tend to earn lower wages 
than the ever married, which is to be expected due to family allowances for employment 
in any sector. The West Bank dummy is not often significant for females, but more so for 
males. It varies from year to year, however the negative sign for most of the years is 
possibly due to selection correction. In reality, average daily wage is possibly comparable 
in the public sector between the West Bank and Gaza, however, it is higher in the private 
sector and the other sector in the West Bank. 
 
5.3.3 Decomposition of Wage Differential: Estimates of differential decomposition are 
found in Table (A11) with selection adjustment. The results show that the “other”-private 
wage gap is positive for males for all years except 2007viii. This implies that predicted log 
hourly wages are on average lower in the private sector than in the other sector; this result 
is not surprising since the other sector includes NGO’s, foreign government, and 
international and UN organizations, where one expects higher wages. The Public /private 
wage differential for males is also positive (except for 2007), however, it is lower for the 
“other”/private wage gap. For females, the wage gap is positive for all years (except 
public in 1999) including 2007; this implies that female wages were not impacted 
negatively by the 2007 events as did male wages. The wage gap for males between other 
and private is always higher for males than females; this means that males do better in the 
other or public sector when compared to the private sector; while female gains are 
smaller from selecting those sectors.  
 
The endowment effect is almost always negative for male, but the opposite for female, 
this means that had females predictor levels in sector j been applied to the private sector, 
their wages would be expected to rise, and the opposite would be the case males. But in 
any case, the residual component seems to dominate the endowment effect. Tansel 2004 
found similar results stemming from differences in the constant. Palestine is also known 
to have low returns to education (endowments) which contributes to this phenomenon. 
 
Returning to the gender wage gap by sector, the results indicate that for the public sector 
the gap is negative indicating higher predicted log hourly wages for females for all years. 
The evidence is mixed for the other years without particular trend overtime. The 
endowment effect potentially explains as much as much as 84% of the gap in public 
sector in 2007 and 32% in 2010. In the other sectors, the residual dominates, again owing 
mostly to the intercept. It is also evident that the endowment effect is negative; indicating 
that if male predictor levels were applied to females, the expected change in wages will 
be negative.  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The results of the study point to stark gender differences in the three dimensions of the 
study, sector selection, returns to education and wage decomposition. For sector 
selection, experience increases the probability of sector selection (for all three sectors 
compared to not working) at a decreasing rate for men and women. Unlike men, 
education improves the probability of joining all sectors for all levels of education almost 
for all years of the study. In contrast, this is only true for the public and “other” sectors 
for men. Education seems to reduce the probability of joining the private sector, Table A2 
reflects the distribution of males across the various educational attainments showing that 
a higher concentration of lower educational levels in the private sector compared to the 
other two sectors. The marginal effect of the West bank dummy shows that males in West 
Bank are less likely to be in the public or “other” sectors than Gazans, but more likely to 
be in the private sector. For females, it is positive in the public and private sectors, but 
negative in the “other” sector; which means that in the West Bank Women are like men 
in the sense they are more likely to be in the private and “other” than Gazans, but unlike 
men, they are more likely to be in the public sector than Gazan women. Gender 
differences also exist with regard to the social status, never married women are more 
likely to join any sector than the base group (married, widowed and divorced); for men 
the opposite is true. This indicates that the social order of men being the bread winners in 
the households still seems to hold; females tend to be less likely to join the labor force 
once married. Refugee status hood also affects men and women differently, while refugee 
women are less likely to join any sector than none refugees, for men this is only true for 
public and “other sectors”; however, refugee men are more likely than none refugees to 
select the private sector. 
 
Returns to education exhibit none linear behavior, using OLS, it is found that females’ 
return to education are higher than males for almost all levels of education. It is also 
found that successive levels of education have a larger difference from the base group as 
educational attainment increases. This was found to be the case for men and women. 
However, when the analysis was carried out with sector selection correction, male return 
estimates did conform to the above findings qualitatively, but female equation estimates 
were less robust. Female return estimates varied across time and sector. 
 
Finally, analysis of sector wage differential decomposition show that the differential 
between public and private is positive (for men), implying higher predicted log hourly 
wages in the public and “other” sectors. Similar findings were also observed for females, 
but to a smaller magnitude. The endowment effect points to males being overpaid in the 
public and “other” sectors compared to the private sector, but females are underpaid. But 
overall, the endowment effect is dominated by the residual effect (unexplained or 
discrimination) in explaining the wage differential. The gender wage gap shows that 
average log hourly wages is predicted to be higher for females in the public sector only, 
and that the endowment effect explains a good portion of the difference. For the private 
and “other” sectors, the evidence is mixed without a particular trend overtime. 
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7. Annex  
8. Table A5: Average Weekly Work Hours and Average Hourly Wage by Activity in the Private Sector  
 1999 2001 2007 2010 
Sector Industry Hourly wagea 
Weekly 
work 
hours 
Hourly 
wagea 
Weekly 
work 
hours 
Hourly 
wagea 
Weekly 
work 
hours 
Hourly 
wagea 
Weekly 
work 
hours 
Private 
Sector 
Agriculture 7.61 44.23 8.89 27.29 10.67 22.63 8.39 26.53 
Manufacturing 7.37 46.33 8.36 38.96 9.42 32.37 10.39 33.62 
Construction 12.57 43.47 13.85 30.17 15.71 23.54 17.11 25.39 
Commerce-
Hotels 8.21 48.44 8.76 41.89 8.98 37.45 9.06 37.77 
Transport-
storage 7.08 50.06 7.20 46.06 9.04 35.67 13.72 36.37 
Other b 9.15 43.76 9.92 38.33 12.70 31.19 14.82 31.35 
Total 9.80 45.21 10.31 36.05 11.56 30.04 12.87 31.19 
Other Sector 11.94 39.58 12.12 37.33 15.69 27.57 16.06 21.67 
Public Sector 7.69 41.86 7.89 39.10 11.14 29.55 11.93 24.41 
Source: Authors calculation based on Labor Force Scurvies, 1999, 2001, 2007 & 2010 
Note: The sample includes West Bank & Gaza Strip wage employees, Prime-aged (15-65 years old) 
for male & female 
a: Measured in New Israeli Shekel
b: Activities not otherwise classified 
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TableA2: Summary Statistics of Variables by sector in Palestinian Territory, Male. 
Variables/Sector 
1999 2001 
Public Private Other Public Private Other 
Log hourly wages a 
1.89 2.10 2.37 1.91 2.18 2.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience c 
18 15 21 17 16 19
(0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Experience Square 
460 344 605 413 356 467
(1.04) (0.47) (2.60) (0.89) (0.52) (1.89)
Education b              
                Level 1 1.1% 2.3% 1.7% 1.0% 1.6% 1.5%
                Level 2 34.2% 72.5% 35.3% 32.8% 72.8% 35.4%
                Level 3 35.4% 20.0% 30.5% 35.5% 19.3% 27.3%
                Level 4 26.3% 4.7% 29.0% 27.5% 5.4% 28.3%
                Level 5 3.1% .5% 3.5% 3.2% .9% 7.5%
Never married b 17.7% 36.5% 16.1% 23.4% 34.1% 18.0%
Region b             
          West Bank 47.9% 73.7% 65.6% 47.3% 77.8% 61.3%
          Gaza Strip 52.1% 26.3% 34.4% 52.7% 22.2% 38.7%
Refugeeb 49.3% 36.0% 58.1% 49.6% 34.0% 58.9%
Sample Size          5,033          17,220            915          4,899           10,859            818 
Source: Authors calculation based on Labor Force Scurvies, 1999, 2001, 2007 & 2010 
Note: The sample includes West Bank & Gaza Strip wage employees, Prime-aged (15-65 years old) for male & 
female 
a: Measured in New Israeli Shekel 
b: Indicate dummy variables 
c: Experience is equal age-years of school -6  
 Education dummy: Level1: illiterate , Level2:  the less than secondary, Level3: secondary & lower Diploma, Level4: 
BA & high Diploma and Level 5: MA & PhD 
Standard error is between brackets  
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TableA3: Summary Statistics of Variables by sector in Palestinian Territory, Male. 
Variables/Sector 
2007 2010 
Public Private Other Public Private Other 
Log hourly wages a 
2.21 2.19 2.54 2.27 2.26 2.51
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience c 
17 16 19 18 16 19
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Experience Square 
386 361 503 413 392 520
(0.60) (0.45) (1.63) (0.58) (0.43) (1.69)
Education b              
                Level 1 .2% .8% .7% .3% .7% .8%
                Level 2 35.1% 71.8% 33.9% 35.0% 69.9% 39.1%
                Level 3 34.9% 19.9% 28.4% 28.0% 19.6% 20.3%
                Level 4 26.3% 6.5% 30.7% 32.4% 8.1% 34.6%
                Level 5 3.4% 1.1% 6.4% 4.4% 1.7% 5.3%
Never married b 21.3% 36.4% 21.7% 14.3% 34.1% 19.9%
Region b             
          West Bank 45.5% 81.5% 54.0% 43.5% 83.0% 43.8%
          Gaza Strip 54.5% 18.5% 46.0% 56.5% 17.0% 56.2%
Refugeeb 51.9% 33.0% 66.4% 49.8% 27.8% 67.1%
Sample Size          5,543          10,894          1,103          5,913           13,241          1,091 
Source: Authors calculation based on Labor Force Scurvies, 1999, 2001, 2007 & 2010 
Note: The sample includes West Bank & Gaza Strip wage employees, Prime-aged (15-65 years old) for male & 
female 
a: Measured in New Israeli Shekel 
b: Indicate dummy variables 
c: Experience is equal age-years of school -6  
 Education dummy: Level1: illiterate , Level2:  the less than secondary, Level3: secondary & lower Diploma, Level4: 
BA & high Diploma and Level 5: MA & PhD 
Standard error is between brackets  
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Table A4: Summary Statistics of Variables by sector in Palestinian Territory, Female. 
Variables/Sector 
1999 2001 
Public Private Other Public Private Other 
Log hourly wages a 
2.04 1.56 2.16 2.03 1.61 2.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience c 
14 13 17 13 13 16
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Experience Square 
293 269 404 271 294 356
(1.19) (1.36) (3.05) (1.18) (1.49) (2.21)
Education b              
                Level 1 .3% 3.0% 1.0% .1% 3.1% .4%
                Level 2 5.1% 44.1% 16.3% 6.2% 41.9% 6.7%
                Level 3 52.2% 36.5% 55.4% 42.8% 34.7% 54.4%
                Level 4 40.8% 15.5% 25.8% 49.9% 19.1% 36.7%
                Level 5 1.6% .9% 1.5% 1.0% 1.1% 1.7%
Never married b 33.0% 62.0% 35.0% 34.5% 63.8% 32.0%
Region b             
          West Bank 73.2% 89.9% 73.0% 72.6% 88.5% 68.2%
          Gaza Strip 26.8% 10.1% 27.0% 27.4% 11.5% 31.8%
Refugeeb 38.7% 36.1% 50.4% 40.0% 32.1% 51.8%
Sample Size        1,086         1,440          482        1,033        1,034           405 
Source: Authors calculation based on Labor Force Scurvies, 1999, 2001, 2007 & 2010 
Note: The sample includes West Bank & Gaza Strip wage employees, Prime-aged (15-65 years old) for 
male & female 
a: Measured in New Israeli Shekel 
b: Indicate dummy variables 
c: Experience is equal age-years of school -6  
 Education dummy: Level1: illiterate , Level2:  the less than secondary, Level3: secondary & lower 
Diploma, Level4: BA & high Diploma and Level 5: MA & PhD 
Standard error is between brackets  
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Table A5: Summary Statistics of Variables by sector in Palestinian Territory, Female. 
Variables/Sector 
2007 2010 
Public Private Other Public Private Other 
Log hourly wages a 
2.46 1.78 2.49 2.47 1.94 2.36
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience c 
15 14 14 14 14 13
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Experience Square 
304 314 320 301 314 269
(1.03) (1.23) (1.73) (0.82) (1.10) (1.41)
Education b              
                Level 1 .2% 1.6%  .1% 1.3% .5%
                Level 2 8.6% 39.0% 15.8% 5.8% 30.0% 11.9%
                Level 3 30.2% 28.9% 29.5% 25.9% 30.0% 26.3%
                Level 4 58.1% 27.4% 52.4% 64.3% 35.2% 57.1%
                Level 5 2.9% 3.1% 2.3% 4.0% 3.5% 4.3%
Never married b 23.6% 56.5% 33.8% 20.5% 47.1% 31.9%
Region b             
          West Bank 74.4% 88.8% 63.1% 72.6% 87.8% 49.4%
          Gaza Strip 25.6% 11.2% 36.9% 27.4% 12.2% 50.6%
Refugeeb 44.3% 35.8% 58.3% 40.1% 30.1% 66.9%
Sample Size        1,288         1,373          614        1,801        1,758           765 
Source: Authors calculation based on Labor Force Scurvies, 1999, 2001, 2007 & 2010 
Note: The sample includes West Bank & Gaza Strip wage employees, Prime-aged (15-65 years old) for 
male & female 
a: Measured in New Israeli Shekel 
b: Indicate dummy variables 
c: Experience is equal age-years of school -6  
 Education dummy: Level1: illiterate , Level2:  the less than secondary, Level3: secondary & lower 
Diploma, Level4: BA & high Diploma and Level 5: MA & PhD 
Standard error is between brackets  
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Table A6: Marginal effects of multinomial logit by sector - male 
1999 2001 
Variables/Sector 
Public Private Other Public Private Other 
B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Experience 0.0069* 0.0009 0.0168* 0.0010 0.0022* 0.0005 0.0085* 0.0011  0.0096* 0.0011 0.0040* 0.0007
Experience Square   -0.0001* 0.0000  -0.0003* 0.0000  -0.00002* 0.0000  -0.00006* 0.0000  -0.0002* 0.0000  -0.0001* 0.0000
Level 1 (d) 0.1059* 0.0215 0.0622* 0.0237 0.0008 0.0101 0.1533* 0.0275 0.0005 0.0263 -0.0023 0.0164
Level 2 (d) 0.2566* 0.0218  -0.1118* 0.0243 0.0244* 0.0103 0.3296* 0.0277  -0.1833* 0.0268 0.0127 0.0165
Level 3 (d) 0.4396* 0.0223  -0.2925* 0.0266 0.0548* 0.0105 0.4788* 0.0281  -0.3009* 0.0282 0.0326* 0.0165
Level 4 (d) 0.5758* 0.0337  -0.4497* 0.0535 0.0514* 0.0136 0.5183* 0.0361  -0.3420* 0.0424 0.0422* 0.0186
Never  Married (d)  -0.0210** 0.0113  -0.1009* 0.0136 -0.0083 0.0072 -0.0201 0.0134  -0.0869* 0.0137   -0.0167** 0.0099
Household total wages  -0.0023* 0.0001 0.0020* 0.0001 0.0002* 0.0000  -0.0017* 0.0001  0.0012* 0.0001 0.0003* 0.0000
Household size -0.0012 0.0010  -0.0025* 0.0012 0.0007 0.0005  -0.0047* 0.0013  -0.0031* 0.0013 0.0015* 0.0007
Refugee (d)  -0.0168* 0.0063 0.0447* 0.0074  -0.0350* 0.0036 -0.0062 0.0072  0.0659* 0.0075   -0.0495* 0.0046
WB& GS (d)  -0.0566* 0.0063 0.1048* 0.0076 0.0161* 0.0033  -0.1385* 0.0072 0.1867* 0.0081  -0.0121* 0.0040
  2007 2010 
Experience 0.0130* 0.0007 0.0212* 0.00071 0.0019* 0.0003 0.0086* 0.0010 0.0120* 0.0011 0.0013* 0.0005
Experience Square   -0.0002* 0.0000  -0.0003* 0.00001  -0.00001* 0.0000  -0.0001* 0.0000  -0.0002* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Level 1 (d) 0.1017* 0.0270 0.1154* 0.02106 0.0094 0.0123 0.0598 0.0383 0.1002* 0.0370 -0.0034 0.0161
Level 2 (d) 0.2128* 0.0271 0.0556* 0.02149 0.0266* 0.0124 0.1774* 0.0386 -0.0235 0.0374 0.0083 0.0163
Level 3 (d) 0.3601* 0.0272 0.1130* 0.02241 0.0598* 0.0124 0.3357* 0.0386   -0.1617* 0.0378 0.0439* 0.0162
Level 4 (d) 0.4309* 0.0331 0.3455* 0.04036 0.0783* 0.0136 0.3107* 0.0408  -0.1337* 0.0435 0.0294** 0.0170
Never  Married (d)  -0.0265* 0.0080 0.0740* 0.00870 -0.0031 0.0043  -0.0432* 0.0130  -0.0647* 0.0145 -0.0040 0.0072
Household total wages  -0.0001* 0.0000 -0.00005 0.00004 0.0001* 0.0000  -0.0006* 0.0000  0.0004* 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000
Household size  -0.0040* 0.0008  -0.0102* 0.00095 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0001 0.0012  -0.0074* 0.0014 0.0009 0.0006
Refugee (d) 0.0019 0.0042 0.0395* 0.00484  -0.0309* 0.0026  -0.0111** 0.0062 0.0474* 0.0068  -0.0282* 0.0041
WB& GS (d)  -0.0319* 0.0044 0.1267* 0.00599  -0.0089* 0.0023  -0.0113** 0.0066 0.1162* 0.0079  -0.0285* 0.0031
 See notes below Table A8 
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Table A7: Marginal effects of multinomial logit by sector – female 
1999 2001 
Variables/Sector Public Private Other Public Private Other 
B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Experience 0.0038* 0.000 0.0030* 0.000 0.0011* 0.000 0.0046* 0.001 0.0027* 0.000 0.0025* 0.000
Experience Square   -0.0001* 0.000  -0.00004* 0.000  -0.00001* 0.000  -0.00009* 0.000  -0.00004* 0.000  -0.00004* 0.000
Level 1 (d) 0.018 0.021 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.028 -0.004 0.007 -0.002 0.012
Level 2 (d) 0.0868* 0.020 0.0292* 0.008 0.0211* 0.006 0.0926* 0.028 0.008 0.007 0.0231* 0.011
Level 3 (d) 0.1248* 0.021 0.0500* 0.008 0.0300* 0.007 0.1437* 0.028 0.0424* 0.008 0.0362* 0.012
Level 4 (d) 0.1355* 0.024 0.0759* 0.017 0.0289* 0.012 0.1270* 0.032 0.0408* 0.018 0.0451* 0.014
Never  Married (d) 0.0244* 0.004 0.0480* 0.004 0.0068* 0.003 0.0160* 0.005 0.0398* 0.004 0.006 0.004
Household total wages 0.0001* 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 0.0001* 0.000
Household size  -0.0022* 0.000  -0.0026* 0.000  -0.0012* 0.000  -0.0035* 0.001  -0.0033* 0.001  -0.0025* 0.001
Refugee (d)  -0.0072* 0.003  -0.0056* 0.003  -0.0106* 0.002  -0.0093* 0.003 -0.003 0.003  -0.0152* 0.003
WB& GS (d) 0.0137* 0.003 0.0313* 0.004 0.0035** 0.002 0.0132* 0.004 0.0267* 0.004 -0.001 0.002
  2007 2010 
Experience 0.0055* 0.001 0.0033* 0.000 0.0015* 0.000 0.0065* 0.001 0.0035* 0.000 0.0016* 0.000
Experience Square   -0.0001* 0.000  -0.00004* 0.000  -0.00002* 0.000  -0.0001* 0.000  -0.00004* 0.000  -0.00002* 0.000
Level 1 (d) -0.074 1.945 -0.003 0.514 0.176 7.017 -0.007 0.019 -0.012 0.009 -0.003 0.008
Level 2 (d) -0.016 1.945 0.007 0.514 0.189 7.017 0.0480* 0.019 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.008
Level 3 (d) 0.042 1.945 0.039 0.514 0.210 7.017 0.1099* 0.019 0.0500* 0.010 0.0331* 0.009
Level 4 (d) 0.021 1.945 0.069 0.514 0.211 7.017 0.1476* 0.021 0.0873* 0.014 0.0484* 0.010
Never  Married (d) 0.0081** 0.005 0.0443* 0.004 0.0071* 0.003 0.0206* 0.005 0.0464* 0.004 0.0108* 0.003
Household total wages 0.0002* 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 0.00003* 0.000
Household size  -0.0028* 0.001  -0.0036* 0.001  -0.0018* 0.000  -0.0041* 0.001  -0.0031* 0.001  -0.0016* 0.000
Refugee (d)  -0.0073* 0.003 -0.001 0.003  -0.0100* 0.003  -0.0070* 0.003 0.001 0.003  -0.0106* 0.003
WB& GS (d) 0.0231* 0.004 0.0351* 0.005  -0.0067* 0.002 0.0251* 0.003 0.0403* 0.005  -0.0087* 0.002
 See notes below Table A8 
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Table A8: Selectivity corrected estimates of wage equations for Palestinian males 
  1999 2001 
  Public Private Other Public Private Other 
Variables B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Experience 0.02* 0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.022* 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02** 0.01
Experience Square (10-3 ) -0.10 0.10 0.09* 0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.60* 0.20
Level 1 (d) 0.26* 0.06 0.21* 0.09 0.23** 0.12 0.27* 0.09 0.53* 0.13 0.308 0.18
Level 2 (d) 0.84* 0.08 0.82** 0.10 0.62* 0.14 0.89* 0.09 1.35* 0.15 1.10* 0.18
Level 3 (d) 1.47* 0.10 1.56 0.14 0.89* 0.19 1.41* 0.10 2.01* 0.18 1.61* 0.22
Level 4 (d) 1.94* 0.13 1.99 0.22 1.26* 0.24 1.66* 0.12 2.02* 0.21 1.59* 0.23
Never  Married (d) -0.03 0.09 -0.05 0.07 -0.04 0.19 0.01 0.07 -0.16 0.10 0.69* 0.26
WG & GS (d) -0.16* 0.02 -0.12* 0.03 -0.17* 0.05 -0.38* 0.04 -0.50* 0.06 -0.67* 0.09
Constant 0.01 0.15 2.54* 0.14 3.37* 0.46 0.08 0.13 2.78* 0.23 2.84* 0.40
Number of obs 13757 12184 
LR chi2   13015.33 13145.31 
Prob> chi2     0 0 
Log likelihood  -8917.5376 -8453.7421 
Pseudo R2 0.4219 0.4374 
  2007 2010 
Experience 0.04* 0.01 0.04* 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05* 0.01 0.05* 0.01 0.00 0.02
Experience Square  -0.50* 0.10 -0.50* 0.20 -0.10 0.30 -0.80* 0.20 -0.80* 0.20 -0.10 0.30
Level 1 (d) 0.41* 0.20 0.74* 0.26 1.03* 0.50 0.2816 0.22 0.2179 0.30 -0.634 0.44
Level 2 (d) 1.46* 0.24 1.87* 0.29 2.34* 0.49 1.05* 0.22 1.26* 0.31 0.3483 0.45
Level 3 (d) 2.31* 0.28 2.81* 0.33 3.25* 0.53 1.96* 0.25 2.47* 0.35 0.86** 0.48
Level 4 (d) 2.31* 0.27 2.80* 0.36 3.22* 0.55 2.08* 0.26 2.40* 0.38 0.91** 0.48
Never  Married (d) -0.24* 0.09 -0.31* 0.12 -0.68* 0.26 -0.22* 0.08 -0.47* 0.12 0.0109 0.23
WG & GS (d) -0.53* 0.08 -0.21* 0.13 -0.60* 0.18 -0.06* 0.06 0.51* 0.08 0.1304 0.11
Constant -1.33* 0.40 2.56* 0.37 2.53* 0.75 -0.92* 0.31 2.41* 0.34 5.68* 0.74
Number of obs 13588 15669 
LR chi2   15162.17 16943.15 
Prob> chi2     0 0 
Log likelihood  -8967.4028 -9643.7192 
Pseudo R2 0.4581 0.4676 
 * & **, denote the statistical significant at 5%  and 10% levels, respectively . (d) is a dummy variables  
  base category for multinomial logit equation is not working 
  Other category includes UNRWA, NGOs and Foreign and International employees 
  Education dummy: Level1: the less than secondary, Level2: secondary & lower Diploma, Level3: BA & high 
Diploma and Level 4: MA & PhD 
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Table A9: Selectivity corrected estimates of wage equations for Palestinian females 
  1999 2001 
  Public Private Other Public Private Other 
Variables B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Experience 0.002 0.02 -0.006 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.006 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.005 0.02
Experience Square (10-3 ) .20 0.40 .20 0.30 .70 0.80 .10 0.50 .40 0.30 .20 0.40
Level 1 (d) 0.24 0.35 -0.60* 0.22 0.52 0.38 0.45 0.52 0.16 0.22 0.06 0.27
Level 2 (d) 0.67** 0.41 -0.47 0.29 0.53 0.66 1.20** 0.65 0.13 0.27 0.25 0.37
Level 3 (d) 0.72 0.53 -0.16 0.68 0.59 1.55 1.51** 0.88 0.50 0.49 0.43 0.47
Level 4 (d) 0.92** 0.48 0.22 0.68 1.95* 1.04 1.24 0.75 -0.03 0.64 0.11 0.45
Never  Married (d) -0.30* 0.10 -0.69* 0.16 -0.79 0.58 -0.26** 0.14 -0.50* 0.19 -0.27 0.25
WG & GS (d) -0.16* 0.06 0.02 0.15 -0.23 0.38 30.0 0.14 0.22 0.17 -0.04 0.14
Constant 1.31 0.98 3.48* 0.62 2.68* 0.95 -0.11 1.56 2.29* 0.81 3.46* 0.56
Number of obs 13100 11600 
LR chi2   2264.32 2452.9 
Prob> chi2     0 0 
Log likelihood  -2567.4793 -2731.4182 
Pseudo R2 0.306 0.3099 
2007 2010 
Experience -.004 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.07* 0.02 -0.03 0.02
Experience Square  .10 0.30 .50 0.30 .90* 0.50 -.20 0.30 .80* 0.30 .30 0.50
Level 1 (d) -0.05 0.28 0.19 0.34 -0.28 0.40 0.07 0.19 -0.13 0.26 0.07 0.56
Level 2 (d) 0.25 0.27 0.17 0.33 -0.26 0.37 0.47* 0.21 -0.72* 0.26 -0.09 0.57
Level 3 (d) 0.03 0.32 0.28 0.40 -0.77* 0.41 0.47** 0.26 -1.40* 0.37 -0.70 0.69
Level 4 (d) 0.51 0.33 0.11 0.56 0 0.37 0.68* 0.33 -1.46 0.99 -0.07 0.86
Never  Married (d) -0.06 0.10 -0.35* 0.16 0.03 0.26 -0.34* 0.15 -0.78* 0.19 -0.05 0.30
WG & GS (d) -0.11 0.09 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.21 -0.14** 0.09 -0.31 0.28 0.05 0.32
Constant 2.91* 0.62 1.87* 0.72 3.90* 0.59 1.59* 0.67 5.13* 1.21 4.19* 1.23
Number of obs 13287 16045 
LR chi2   3113.14 3566.72 
Prob> chi2     0 0 
Log likelihood  -3141.0857 -4215.9284 
Pseudo R2 0.3314 0.2973 
 * & **, denote the statistical significant at 5%  and 10% levels, respectively . (d) is a dummy variables  
  base category for multinomial logit equation is not working 
  Other category includes UNRWA, NGOs and Foreign and International employees 
  Education dummy: Level1: the less than secondary, Level2: secondary & lower Diploma, Level3: BA & high Diploma and 
Level 4: MA & PhD 
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Table A10: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of selectivity corrected sector wage gap 
 
Other Public 
M F M F 
1999 
Total ( R) 0.8729 0.0143 0.3975 -0.0392 
Endowment (E) 0.0649 0.2143 -0.0235 0.2687 
Coefficient ( C) 0.6969 -0.3770 0.2065 -0.3673 
Interaction (I) 0.1112 0.1770 0.2145 0.0593 
N1, N2 526, 7155 252, 294 3457, 7155 659, 294 
2001 
Total ( R) 3.0526 0.7803 2.6274 0.6030 
Endowment (E) -0.1404 0.1368 -0.2259 0.1482 
Coefficient ( C) 2.8407 0.3998 2.4861 0.3942 
Interaction (I) 0.3523 0.2438 0.3671 0.0605 
N1, N2 712, 4519 351, 264 4611, 4519 862, 264 
2007 
Total ( R) -0.4505 0.7694 -0.6952 0.7953 
Endowment (E) -0.1520 0.2289 -0.1572 0.2664 
Coefficient ( C) -0.6321 0.5928 -0.8449 0.5930 
Interaction (I) 0.3336 -0.0523 0.3069 -0.0641 
N1, N2 731, 1189 415, 94 4153, 1189 916, 94 
2010 
Total ( R) 0.9296 0.3259 0.6756 0.4028 
Endowment (E) -0.2214 -0.1212 -0.0931 0.0997 
Coefficient ( C) 0.8465 0.1483 0.4899 0.2151 
Interaction (I) 0.3045 0.2989 0.2788 0.0880 
N1, N2 643, 6870 429, 488 3547, 6870 1159, 488 
 N1, N2 are the number of observations for sector j and the private sector respectively 
 Estimates were obtained using Stata’s sub-module Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Jann, 2008). 
 The variables included in the log hourly wage are years of schooling, potential experience, quadratic potential 
experience, never married dummy, and West Bank dummy. The selection terms were household wage income, 
household size, and refugee status. 
 Wages are reported in New Israeli Shekels 
 
  
 
 
28 
 
Table A11: Decomposition of selectivity corrected M/F wage differential by sector 
  Public Private Other 
  1999 
Total ( R) -0.5288 0.1012 0.0317 
Endowment (E) -0.1489 -0.1047 -0.0141 
Coefficient ( C) -0.3984 0.1362 0.0294 
Interaction (I) 0.0185 0.0697 0.0164 
N1, N2 3457, 339 10141, 294 526, 131 
  2001 
Total ( R) -0.1956 0.8410 0.1834 
Endowment (E) -0.1308 -0.0977 -0.0843 
Coefficient ( C) -0.0703 0.8859 0.2508 
Interaction (I) 0.0054 0.0528 0.0169 
N1, N2 4611, 414 6952, 264 712, 181 
  2007 
Total ( R) -0.1570 0.8210 -0.3370 
Endowment (E) -0.1324 -0.2062 -0.0589 
Coefficient ( C) 0.0231 0.9332 -0.2371 
Interaction (I) -0.0478 0.0939 -0.0410 
N1, N2 4153, 140 7312, 94 731, 47 
  2010 
Total ( R) -0.5268 -0.3348 1.2739 
Endowment (E) -0.1674 -0.2131 -0.0640 
Coefficient ( C) -0.3878 -0.1697 1.2719 
Interaction (I) 0.0283 0.0480 0.0661 
N1, N2 3547, 652 9429, 488 643, 211 
 N1, N2 are the number of observations for male and female regressions 
 The variables included in the log hourly wage are years of schooling, potential experience, quadratic potential 
experience, never married dummy, and West Bank dummy. The selection terms were household wage income, 
number of children less than 6, and refugee status. 
 Wages are reported in New Israeli Shekels 
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i Sector selection correction was applied using Bourguignon, F., Fournier, M.,Gurgand, M., (2007). selmlog 
program in Stata 
ii The other category includes wage employment in Non-government organizations, foreign government, 
international organization, UNRWA, and other undefined wage employment. This leaves out employers, 
self-employment, and unpaid family workers. 
iii The year 2007 witnessed a political separation between the West Bank and Gaza after Hamas took over 
Gaza. Since then, Israel launched a war in 2008 and enforced a blockade on Gaza resulting in a very 
distressed social and economic situation for Gazans. 
iv The refugee status refers to those who were expelled in 1948 and hold an UNRWA refugee card, they 
mostly reside in camps, but not limited to camps. Many of those joined the ranks of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and then became with the Palestine National Authority (PNA). 
vJann (2008) also provides a user written add-on to Stata to implement the decomposition; this routine 
“Oaxaca” was used to carry out the decomposition. 
vi The analysis was carried out for the decomposition with years of schooling, potential experience, 
quadratic potential experience, West Bank and Gaza dummy, a never married dummy. The Oaxaca 
command was accompanied with Heckman (two step) selection correction using household wage income, 
refugee status and household size as sector selection identifiers. 
vii The predictors are schooling, potential experience, potential experience squared, never married and West 
Bank and Gaza dummy. When the Heckman 2-step procedure was used to correct for selection, 3 other 
variables were used: household total wages, household size, and refugee status. 
viii The year 2007 was chosen because it follows the domination of Hamas 2006 elections. The international 
community boycott of the PA stopping aid payments resulted in a shut-down of the government in 2007 
where real GDP growth reached 1.1% while unemployment reached 25% for men and 35% for women. 
